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Outline: The Soviet peace offensive

I. Since the death of Stalin, the new Soviet government has modified many of the tactics characteristic of the Stalin regime, both in internal and foreign policy.

A. We do not believe, however, that the strategic objectives of the USSR under Stalin have changed. These are:

1. The consolidation and defense of the Soviet Orbit.
2. The neutralization of US military power, particularly American superiority in atomic weapons.
3. The weakening and disruption of the Western coalition and the isolation of the US from its allies.
4. The reduction and ultimate elimination of Western, particularly US, power and influence in Asia and the Far East.
5. The achievement of Communist control of, or a major voice in, Asian governments.

B. We consider, however, that current Soviet tactics, both in the "peace offensive" and in Soviet internal affairs, are more

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intelligently devised to accomplish these objectives and are being more subtly applied than Stalin's tactics.

II. Foreign Policy.

A. In general, Soviet foreign tactics are more cleverly designed to accomplish the weakening of Western alliances, reduction of US-UK collaboration, and dissipation of Western influence in Asia.

B. Korea - The Kremlin apparently viewed the truce as a sine qua non for the success of its other tactics.

C. Tactics in Germany appear designed to foster unity sentiment. There is still no indication of Soviet willingness to achieve unity on terms acceptable to the West. Developments here are:

1. Abolition of the Soviet Control Commission and appointment of a civilian high commissioner paralleling the setup in West Germany.

2. Reversal of Sovietization drive, including

- a) Agreement with the church.

- b) Halt in collectivization.
- c) Promise to restore land to refugees who return.
- d) Lifting restrictions on businessmen and teachers.
- e) Liberation of 4000 imprisoned for economic crimes.

D. Tactics in Austria are designed to offset Soviet refusal to negotiate a pact and to underline the Kremlin's new liberal approach. Developments here include:

- 1) Appointment of Soviet Ambassador.
- 2) Lifting restrictions on movement of goods and persons.
- 3) Hands off policy on Austrian police.
- 4) Sale of disputed hydro-electric plant *(at Ybbbs, on the Danube west of Vienna)* to Austria.

E. Diplomatic moves in Balkans are designed to support the peace offensive, nullify the Balkan Pact, and undermine Tito. Developments here are:

- 1. Offer to exchange ambassadors with Greece.
- 2. Offer to exchange ambassadors with Yugoslavia.

3. Relinquishment of territorial claims against Turkey
and of demands for share in defense of the Straits.

F. In the Near East, there have been the following
developments related to the "peace" campaign:

- 1) Signing of a barter agreement with Iran.
- 2) Indications of a forthcoming effort to settle
outstanding Soviet-Iranian differences.
- 3) Move toward resumption of diplomatic relations
with Israel.

III. Economic

A. The USSR is continuing to use trade and trade prop-
aganda in support of its political efforts to undermine western
solidarity.

1. Current approaches are more realistic, however,
and more skillfully tailored to accord with the economic
bargaining strength of each Western European country.

B. The USSR is offering to purchase larger quantities of
consumer goods, contingent on delivery of strategic items, and

thus exercising powerful leverage on Western producers.

C. New tactics exploit Western fears of US tariff measures.

IV. Internal Developments

A. Reversal of the Doctors' Plot.

B. Party and government reorganization.

C. Merging of the MVD and MGB - the coercive apparatus of the Soviet rulers - with a significant diminution of its powers.

D. Significant drop in the vitriolic tone and quantity of Hate-America propaganda lines.

E. Amnesty decree and promise to rewrite the criminal code with emphasis on peoples' rights.

F. Price Reductions.

G. Indications of new emphasis on consumer's goods and other economic policies beneficial to the individual.

H. Indications that the previous Russification program in the various Soviet Republics is being played down.

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~~I~~ Consistency of these policies points to at least majority agreement at the top of the Soviet political hierarchy. Apparently the new leaders are more flexible than Stalin in developing new tactics to meet the USSR's problems. Stalin's approach, his extreme dependency on coercion, tension and vitriolic propaganda may well have ^{been} the products of his times. The present leaders with a more highly industrialized and better educated country may feel that their approach will give them better stability, raise the morale of the people and achieve the primary objectives of Communism with greater ease and less cost.

V. Satellites - Evidence from the satellites reinforces the view that the new Soviet policies are tailored to accomplish specific objectives and do not indicate any significant change in basic aims.

A. No major changes in the leadership of the satellite communist parties or governments have occurred.

B. There has been no significant easing of pressures on

satellite peoples.

C. Measures to increase the popularity of the USSR and the orbit regimes are either missing or on a very minor scale.

D. No changes in security apparatus; preaching of "vigilance" continues.

E. Continued military buildup.

VI. Conclusions

A. At the ~~WPC~~ ^{World Peace Congress,} Ehrenburg ^{summed} up Soviet aims as:

1. Admission of Communist China to UN.

2. Creation of neutral Germany.

3. Breaking ^{-off} of small nations from NATO, ^(and their negotiations of) ~~into~~ regional pacts with neighbors.

B. Current situation illustrates increased flexibility of the new regime in tactical maneuvers to achieve continuing Soviet objectives.

C. USSR still hopes to exploit Western differences, calculated to increase in scope after the end of fighting in Korea.

D. Economic pressures may play an increased role as underpinning to political efforts to achieve Soviet aims.

E. Western reactions to the new Soviet tactics are likely to encourage the Kremlin with the belief that it is pursuing the right course.